Le mercantilisme de Trump et la gestion de l'offre

Un article signé par Bruno Larue.

2018-3 Optimal Credible Warnings,

recherche multidisciplinaire par K. Akakpo, M. Boucher et V. Boucher

Larue, Singbo et Pouliot

Philippe Barla et Jérémie Dorval

2013-4 On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less

Série Cahiers du CREATE
Mohamed Jeddy - Non membre
Bruno Larue - Chercheur régulier
Sébastien Pouliot - Chercheur associé

We first show in the context of sequential multi-unit auctions under complete information that a seller’s revenue may increase or decrease as the number of buyers increases, even when the additional bidders win an object. We use data from the Quebec daily hog auction to empirically analyze the effect of invitations extended to bidders from Ontario. Our estimation accounts for the endogenous timing of these rare invitations, but we nevertheless uncover a negative “invitation” effect. We attribute this anti-competitive effect to the fact that the addition of bidders increases competition in late rounds, but not necessarily in early ones.

Date pour le tri: 
Lundi, Avril 8, 2013