We first show in the context of sequential multi-unit auctions under complete information that a sellers revenue may increase or decrease as the number of buyers increases, even when the additional bidders win an object. We use data from the Quebec daily hog auction to empirically analyze the effect of invitations extended to bidders from Ontario. Our estimation accounts for the endogenous timing of these rare invitations, but we nevertheless uncover a negative invitation effect. We attribute this anti-competitive effect to the fact that the addition of bidders increases competition in late rounds, but not necessarily in early ones.
2013-4 On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less
Type:
Série Cahiers du CREATE
Année:
2013
Auteurs:
Mohamed Jeddy - Non membre
Bruno Larue - Chercheur régulier
Sébastien Pouliot - Chercheur associé
Fichier:
Sujets:
Date pour le tri:
Lundi, Avril 8, 2013
Thématiques:
Agroalimentaire